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HEALTH LAW-NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING AND YOU: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN HOSPITALS FAIL TO MONITOR PHYSICIANS.

I. INTRODUCTION

When a person goes to a hospital seeking medical aid and is harmed
during the course of treatment due to someone else's negligence, who is at
fault? The answer might be the person who directly caused the harm, such
as a physician who amputates the wrong leg. What happens, though, when a
hospital's governing body or administrators are aware of the physician's
previous acts of incompetence? In addition, what happens when the hospital
welcomes a physician to its staff without a thorough background check or
without fully ascertaining the doctor's abilities?
In cases where the hospital's thoroughness in hiring and monitoring the
skill of its physicians is unclear, plaintiffs may find that a negligent credentialing claim is appropriate. A medical malpractice victim may file a claim
of negligent credentialing when the victim of medical malpractice suspects
or discovers the offending doctor's prior instances of incompetence or malpractice and brings suit against the hospital that allowed the physician to
continue practicing medicine.'
Larson v. Wasemiller,2 decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
2007, is the latest case to address this issue, continuing a debate that began
in 1965 with the Illinois Supreme Court's landmark decision in Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.3 Many other state courts have
considered this issue during the years between Darling and Larson, basing
their decisions on various theories of direct and vicarious liability. Arkansas,
however, is not one of those states, and the issue remains one of first impression. This note contends that Arkansas should prepare to address this
issue, as a plaintiff will almost certainly assert a negligent credentialing
claim at some point in the future. In order to prevent the negligent credentialing of physicians in Arkansas hospitals, the legislature and the Arkansas
State Medical Board (ASMB) should thoroughly research this issue to en1. James W. Gustafson Jr. & Thomas D. Masterson, ChallengingHospitals That Tolerate Incompetent Doctors, 39 TRIAL 18, 21 (May 2003). Negligent credentialing "should be
reserved for cases in which a hospital unreasonably exposed its patients to harm by granting
staff privileges to a physician with a demonstrable history of questionable conduct or inadequate training." Id.
2. 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007). Mary Larson filed suit against Drs. Paul and James
Wasemiller after a botched gastric bypass procedure that ultimately required more surgery
and a stay at a long-term care facility. Id. at 302.
3. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
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sure that all necessary steps are taken to prevent negligent credentialing
from occurring, and the court system should prepare itself to analyze this
issue carefully. The background of this note will consider the development
of the theory of negligent credentialing, including various theories of liability upon which negligent credentialing may be based, the hiring process of
physicians, safeguards put in place to prevent negligent credentialing, and
Arkansas's approach to negligent credentialing. If and when a negligent
credentialing case is presented in Arkansas, this note proposes that the Arkansas courts should recognize negligent credentialing as a tort action.
II. BACKGROUND

A hospital's knowledge of a doctor's misdeeds from which a negligent
credentialing action may arise is almost irrelevant. Under the negligent credentialing theory, a plaintiff may argue either that the hospital knew the
physician was incompetent and turned a blind eye, or that the hospital did
not know but should have discovered the incompetence during thorough
evaluation and re-evaluation procedures. 4 In proving the basic elements of a
negligent credentialing claim,5 a plaintiff must show that:
[(1)] The hospital had a duty to select and retain competent physicians
seeking staff privileges;
[(2)] The hospital was negligent in granting staff privileges to the physician, by either failing to perform an adequate investigation or simply ignoring facts uncovered by its investigation;
[(3)] The incompetent physician was negligent in treating the patient and
caused his or her injury; and
[(4)] The incompetent physician's negligence took place at the hospital.6

4. Gustafson & Masterson, supra note 1, at 19-20 (citing Insigna v. LaBella, 543 So.
2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989); Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (Ohio 1990), overruled on other grounds, Clarke v. Southview Hosp.'s Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46
(Ohio 1994)).
5. Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liabilityfor Torts of
Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REv. 431, 467-68 (1996). The plaintiff is

required
to prove negligence on the part of the hospital in the selecting or supervising
process. Particularly where the hospital's alleged negligence is not active, but
constitutes a failure to act, foreseeability of the harm that resulted is required.
The hospital's negligence must also be causally related to the plaintiffs injury.
6. Gustafson & Masterson, supra note 1, at 19-20 (citing Insigna v. LaBella, 543 So.
2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989); Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (Ohio 1990), over-
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In other words, plaintiffs must prove that they "would not have been
injured had the hospital taken reasonable care in determining the competence of physicians granted medical staff privileges."7
This section begins by discussing how the negligent credentialing
claim came about and the theories under which courts uphold the tort. Next,
this section covers the process by which potential or current employees are
evaluated before they are hired or re-hired. It also discusses the suggestions
of state or national agencies and other administrative precautions that hospitals may consider in order to combat negligent credentialing. Finally, this
section concludes by detailing Arkansas's current approach to hiring and
credentialing physicians.
A.

Development of the Theory of Negligent Credentialing

The importance of properly credentialing physicians is obvious: if a
hospital does not diligently investigate applicants for privileges, the mistakes made by those physicians will almost always result in legal action
against the hospital.' A question, however, arises from this statement: under
what legal theories would the hospital be liable for the acts of a physician?
Unfortunately, there is a "lack of uniformity among courts" addressing the
concept of negligent credentialing, giving rise to many different theories of
recovery.9
1.

The Independent ContractorProblem

In order to determine the applicable legal theory in a negligent credentialing case, the roles of both the hospital and the physician must be defined.
Some state courts have previously been inclined to adjudge the physician to
be an independent contractor-an individual who is allowed to work on a
hospital's premises but over whom it wields no control and, thus, has no
liability.' °
The importance of a physician's status as an independent contractor
hinges on the theory upon which the plaintiff bases his or her case. For in-

ruled on other grounds, Clarke v. Southview Hosp.'s Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46
(Ohio 1994)).
7. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time ForA Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 22 (1999).
8. Craig W. Dallon, UnderstandingJudicial Review of Hospitals' Physician Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 621 (2000) (quoting Holmes v.
Hoemako Hosp., 573 P.2d 477, 479 (Ariz. 1977)). See also Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 2122.
9. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 462.
10. Gustafson & Masterson, supra note 1, at 20.

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

stance, in Oehler v. Humana Hospital Sunrise," the Nevada Supreme Court
noted that patients had difficulty pursuing hospitals under a respondeat superior theory because physicians were usually found to be independent contractors." The Arizona Supreme Court, in Fridena v. Evans,13 concluded
that while a physician usually falls into the independent contractor category,
the true issue in negligent credentialing cases is not the hospital's alleged
vicarious liability for the acts of an independent contractor physicianrather, the issue is whether the hospital negligently supervised its independent contractors. 4
In Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital,5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court further eliminated any bearing the independent contractor
theory had on negligent credentialing. 6 The Johnson court emphasized the
physician's status as an independent contractor but pointed out that the physician's status was irrelevant, explaining that the hospital was liable under
the duty it owed the plaintiff itself, not for the breach of duty by the physician under the theory of respondeat superior. 7
In the wake of negligent credentialing suits, hospitals have attempted to
clearly define relationships with physicians as principal-independent contractor alliances. 8 One way of creating the appearance of a principalindependent contractor relationship is by drafting a contract between the
hospital and physician that stipulates that the physician is not on salary at
the hospital and that the hospital "has no right of control over the physician
in providing professional services."' 9 Despite the general rule that principals

11. 105 Nev. 348 (1989).
12. Id. at 350.
13. 622 P.2d 463 (Ariz. 1980). This case arose when Sharon Evans, a fifteen-year-old
girl, was injured in a motorcycle accident. Id. at 464. Dr. Fridena performed two surgeries on
Sharon; the first was for a leg injury directly related to the accident, and the second was because the first surgery had left one of Sharon's legs shorter than the other. Id. The second
surgery increased the discrepancy in length between the two legs to an additional inch and a
half. Id. at 465.
14. Id. at 465.
15. 99 Wis. 2d 708 (1981). Johnson involved a patient whose orthopedic surgeon left a
fragment of a pin in the plaintiff's hip while attempting to remove the pins, which the surgeon inserted during a previous surgery. Id. at 710. During a subsequent surgery to remove the
fragment, "the plaintiff's common femoral nerve and artery were damaged, causing a permanent paralytic condition of his right thigh muscles." Id. at 709-10.
16. Id. at 722.
17. Richard L. Griffith & Jordan M. Parker, With Malice Toward None: The Metamorphosis of Statutory and Common Law Protectionsfor Physicians and Hospitals in Negligent
CredentialingLitigation, 22 TEX. TECH L. REv. 157, 163, (1991) (citing Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d
at 722.).
18. Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, HospitalLiabilityfor Torts of
Independent ContractorPhysicians, 47 S.C. L. RFV. 431, 444 (1996).
19. Id.
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are not liable for independent contractors, several doctrines have been used
to circumvent the rule.2 °
2.

The CorporateLiability Approach

An action alleging negligent credentialing under a corporate liability
theory is one way of circumventing the physicians-as-independentcontractors problem because this theory allows the hospital-as an institution-to bear the liability. 2' The theory that the hospital owes a duty to patients reflects the idea that the public looks to the hospital, and not individual physicians, for treatment. 22 This is particularly true of hospital-based physicians, such as pathologists, anesthesiologists, and emergency room physicians.23 The majority of state courts that have addressed this question based
their decisions on corporate liability, also referred to as corporate negligence
or corporate responsibility. 24
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Darling, was the first state court to recognize the error of unequivocally viewing physicians as independent contractors.25 Darling involved a patient with a broken leg that ultimately was
amputated below the knee due to the physician's mistakes when putting on
the cast. 26 The hospital argued that its status as a corporation rendered it
incapable of practicing medicine. 27 The court held that the hospital was not
simply the provider of work space for medical personnel, but rather that the
hospital assumed certain responsibilities to the patients admitted upon its
premises. 8 The effect of Darling was to establish both a direct connection
between hospital and patient and the duties that accompany such a relationship.

20. Id. at 438.
21. George E. Newton II, Maintainingthe Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial
Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REv. 723, 737-38 (2001). See also
Johnson 99 Wis. 2d at 725, ("One of the leading cases introducing the concept that a hospital,
as an institution, has a responsibility for the quality of medical care provided by members of
its medical staff was Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital .....
22. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 468.
23. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 468.
24. See Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263, 269 (Okla. 1995).
25. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965); See
Gustafson & Masterson, supranote 1, at 20.
26. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 255. "[T]he plaintiff, who was 18 years old, broke his leg
while playing in a college football game." Id. at 255-56.
27. Id. at 256. See also Dallon, supra note 8, at 619-20.
28. Id. at 257. "The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to
procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact." Id.
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Many states, including Alaska,29 California, 0 Florida,3 Washington,32
and Wisconsin, 33 have considered corporate liability in the wake of the Darling decision. In Johnson v. MisericordiaCommunity Hospital,34 the Wisconsin Supreme Court clarified the acts and omissions that would place hospitals at risk for a negligent credentialing claim. 35 The plaintiff alleged that the
hospital was negligent in the following way:
(a) by being imprudent and careless in [selecting members] . . . of its
staff; (b) in allowing [physicians] to perform... surgery within its operative facilities when it knew, or should have known, that [the physician]
was not qualified to perform such diagnostic and operative procedures;
[and] (c) in failing to investigate the abilities and qualities of [the physician's] capabilities.., when said hospital knew, or should36 have known,
that [the physician] did not possess such proper capability.
The Johnson court also noted decisions from other jurisdictions and
summarized the various holdings as stipulating that a hospital "has a direct
and independent responsibility to its patients.., to take reasonable steps to
(1) insure that its medical staff is qualified for the privileges granted and/or
(2) to evaluate the care provided."37
Adopting the corporate liability theory, in Strubhart v. Perry Memorial
Hospital Trust Authority,38 the Oklahoma Supreme Court imposed a duty of
ordinary care, requiring hospitals to "take reasonable measures to ensure
patient safety when they are on notice or should be on notice [that] they
have granted staff privileges to an incompetent doctor . . . [and this approach] is generally known as corporate negligence or responsibility."39 The
Strubhart court stressed that what the hospital knew or should have known
of the doctor's conduct was an important factor in deciding cases that applied this theory. 4 The court also expressed doubt that the duty created re29. See Fletcher v. South Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2003). In Fletcher, a
lower court issued summary judgment that dismissed Fletcher's corporate negligence theory
for negligent credentialing, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. at 845.
30. See Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
31. See Insigna, 543 So.2d 209. Insigna involved a man who stole a physician's identity
and was then issued privileges and credentialed by a Miami hospital. Id. at 210.
32. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984).
33. See Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708 (1981).
34. 99 Wis. 2d 708 (1981).
35. Id. at 710.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 724.
38. 903 P.2d 263, 273 (Okla. 1995).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 273.
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quired hospitals to review a physician's work in all cases; rather, the court
limited the duty to the use of ordinary care in situations involving (1) the
granting of staff privileges only to competent physicians, and (2) the reevaluation of physicians holding privileges when the hospital knows or should
know the physician "has engaged in a pattern of incompetent behavior."4
The Minnesota Supreme Court is the most recent state court to address
this issue. In Larson v. Wasemiller,42 the court considered the corporate liability approach 43 before recognizing a common law cause of action for negligent credentialing. 44 In doing so, the court determined that Minnesota's
peer review statute45 implied a cause of action for negligent credentialing
because the immunity provisions would be unnecessary if not for the possibility of a negligent credentialing case.'
3.

DirectLiability

Direct liability is the opposite of vicarious liability-direct liability is
liability for harm caused by one's own actions, but vicarious liability is one
entity's liability for harm caused by the actions of another person or entity.47
Thus, direct hospital liability is liability for a "breach by the hospital of
some duty owed directly to the patient., 41 Where there are established duties
for a hospital, a breach of that direct duty may be easier to prove than the
hospital's vicarious liability for the malpractice of an independent contractor
physician. 49 The direct liability of the hospital arises regardless of whether
the physician who causes the harm is a hospital employee, an independent
contractor, or the patient's personal physician.5"
The direct liability aspect of a negligent credentialing claim does not
encompass a claim for malpractice against a physician because the hospital
did not commit malpractice; instead, the hospital is responsible for its own
negligence. 5' For example, if the patient proves that the hospital's negligence in hiring the physician, whether he or she is an independent contractor
or a hospital employee, is a proximate cause of the harm to the patient, the

41. Id. at 275-76.
42. 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007).
43. Id. at 307-08.
44. Id. at 302.
45. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.63(1) (West 2008).
46. Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 304.
47. Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liabilityfor Torts of
Independent ContractorPhysicians,47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 470.
48. Id. at 462.
49. Id. at 463.
50. Id.
51. Id. at464.
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patient may bring suit directly against the hospital on a direct liability
claim. 2
There are two types of direct duties at issue in a negligent credentialing
claim: either the duty to patients "to exercise care in selecting physicians to
practice on the premises" or the duty of care "in renewing staff privileges."53
4.

Vicarious Liability: ApparentAgency

Rather than face the independent contractor issue that would negate
liability on behalf of the hospital, some state courts that wanted to establish
or increase liability for hospitals began considering whether they could do
so on the basis of apparent agency,' 4 reasoning that patients viewed hospitals
and the physicians who worked in them as two parts of one whole-rather
than as independent entities-neither having control over the other."
56 a South
In Shuler v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center Incorporated,
Carolina court, using prior South Carolina precedent, determined that there
is a three-part test for proving apparent agency. The plaintiff must prove
the following: "(1) that the purported principal consciously or impliedly
represented another to be his agent; (2) that there was a reliance upon the
representation; and (3) that there was a change of position to the relying
party's detriment."58 In Shuler, the court determined that the reliance necessary to prove apparent agency did not exist and found for the hospital. 9
5.

VicariousLiability: The Theory of Non-Delegable Duties

The doctrine of non-delegable duties is sometimes incorporated into a
corporate negligence theory; although the term non-delegable duty has "traditionally been used to describe a form of vicarious liability," some courts
have used the phrase when a hospital's negligence is proven and has a causal relationship to the patient's injury. 6° For example, in Thompson v. Nason
52. Id.
53. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 464-65.
54. Id. at 446. "Decisions holding hospitals liable on the basis of apparent agency date at
least from the California Supreme Court's decision in 1955 in Seneris v. Haas." Id.
55. Newton, supra note 21, at 738. "Consequently, in cases of negligent credentialing,
courts will treat the hospital as if it is the ultimate caregiver and hold it responsible for failure
to meet its duty to properly credential physicians." Id.
56. 437 S.E.2d 128 (S.C. Ct. App.1993).
57. Id. at 129.
58. Id. at 129. See also, McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 471.
59. Shuler, 437 S.E.2d at 130. See also McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 471.
McWilliams and Russell note that this is a "relatively rigorous application of apparent agency
in the hospital context," but that the holding was consistent with similar Georgia cases. Id.
60. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 468.
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Hospital,6' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the phrase, non-delegable
duty, to explain that hospitals cannot "escape liability for their own negligence in performing directly owed duties" by leaving the credentialing
process to their medical staffs.62 This admonition, however, illustrates the
desire of many courts to address the general public's growing reliance on
the hospital itself as the health care provider.63 As one commentator put it,
"non-delegable duties are those that the employer is not allowed to transfer
to another because the responsibility to the community is considered so important."'64
A hospital's non-delegable duties fall into one of four categories:
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate
facilities and equipment;
(2) a duty to select and retain only competent physicians;
(3) a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls
as to patient care; and
(4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce
adequate rules and policies to
65
ensure quality care for the patients.
An Alaska negligent credentialing case, Fletcher v. South Peninsula
Hospital,66 addressed the non-delegable duty theory in relation to different
services the hospital provides. 67 The plaintiffs in Fletcher alleged that an
earlier case 68 implied that hospitals owe patients an absolute, non-delegable
duty of care when choosing emergency room physicians. 69 The court held
that the previous case applied only to emergency room physicians who were
61. 591 A.2d 703 (Pa.1991).
62. Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liabilityfor Torts of
Independent ContractorPhysicians, 47 S.C. L. REv. 431, 470 (1996) (citing Thompson, 591
A.2d 703).
63. Id. at 470-71.
64. Id. at 453-54.
65. Id. at 462-63.
66. 71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2001).
67. Id. at 838. The court noted the following:
We did not extend our holding "to situations where the patient is treated by his or
her own doctor in an emergency room provided for the convenience of the doctor. Such situations are beyond the scope of the duty assumed by an acute care
hospital." Rather, we limited our holding of vicarious hospital liability "to those
situations where a patient comes to the hospital, as an institution, seeking emergency room services and is treated by a physician provided by the hospital."
Id.
68. Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987), superseded by statute. Alaska Stat.
§ 09.65.096, as recognized in Fletcher,71 P.3d 838 (2003).
69. Fletcher, 71 P.3d at 837.
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assigned randomly to patients by the hospital and declined to extend the rule
to a patient who sought out a specific physician.70
In another case, Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority,7 the
court specified that delegating the screening of physicians applying for staff
privileges to the current medical staff does not absolve the hospital of liability as an institution because "these members of the staff are agents of the
[hospital] and it is responsible for any default or negligence on its part in
properly selecting new members of the staff."72 This does not mean that the
hospital's governing board may not delegate the duties of investigating and
credentialing physicians to a smaller committee formed for such a purpose,
but the board must delegate at its own risk, as it will bear the responsibility
if its duty to prevent the hiring of incompetent and unqualified physicians is
breached.73
6.

What About HospitalImmunity?

Depending on its organization and funding, hospitals traditionally enjoyed immunity from suit under the doctrines of charitable immunity or go75
vernmental immunity.74 Non-profit hospitals enjoy charitable immunity,
and government-operated facilities enjoy governmental immunity.76 These
immunities are not as absolute as they once were, however,77 and plaintiffs
may overcome a hospital's claim of immunity, depending upon whether the
jurisdiction in which the plaintiff files his or her claim does or does not rec-

70. Id. at 845.
71. 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971).
72. Id. at 308.
73. Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 744-45 (1981).
74. Dallon, supra note 8, at 617. See also McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 434.
75. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 434-35. There is a public policy "favoring
charity and charitable hospitals, reflecting the view that by benefiting such public-purpose
institutions, the public as a whole was benefited. Charity hospitals were accordingly granted
the public subsidy of immunity." Id.
76. Dallon, supra note 8, at 617.
77. Id.
By the 1940s ...courts began to explicitly reject the charitable immunity doctrine, rendering hospitals liable for their own negligent acts and the negligent acts
of their employees ....Charitable immunity was, after all, an exception to the
general rule that entities are liable for their own actions and the acts of their employees committed within the scope of the employees' employment. The protection of governmental immunity is applicable, if at all, only to federal, state, county, or municipal hospitals. This immunity persists, but, as with charitable immunity, the doctrine has substantially eroded.
Id. at 617-18.
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ognize charitable immunity. 78 Darling also dismissed the idea that a charitable corporation such as a hospital could effectively limit its liability to the
amount of insurance coverage it chose to carry, and the court declined to
limit the judgment to the amount of coverage the hospital held.7 9
B.

Elements of Hiring and Subsequent Re-evaluation

"A physician's livelihood is dependent on acquiring and maintaining
hospital staff privileges. 8 ' To continue to practice medicine, physicians
must maintain a relationship with at least one hospital.8 ' Before a physician
gains privileges at a hospital, however, he or she must be properly evaluated
and approved by the hospital's credentialing committee.82
Hospitals may have numerous procedures in place for the purpose of
evaluating their personnel to ensure that a certain degree of care is maintained. These procedures are used in various instances: when physicians
apply for privileges or the right to work in the facility; when their performance is reviewed, usually at specific intervals after they are hired; and in
instances when an error is made and the need for re-evaluation is neces83
sary.
1.

The Application

When applying for privileges, hospitals require a physician, similar to
others applying for a new job, to submit his or her application to work in
that facility.' At the conclusion of the application process, as with any other
job interview, the applicant may ultimately be offered a position or rejected.8 5 This process of reviewing the application and the outcome of
awarding or denying privileges is referred to as "credentialing. ' 8 6 Credentialing typically involves a committee formed for the particular purpose of
reviewing the physician-applicant's training, certifications, and previous
78. See, e.g., Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475, 484 (Mo. 1972) (stating that the
doctrine of charitable immunity was abolished in Missouri in Abernathy v. Sisters of St.
Mary's,446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969)).
79. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (111.1965).
80. Sheree Lynn McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Suspending and Granting
Staff Privileges,32 BAYLOR L. REv. 175, 175 (1980).
81. Id.
82. Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals' Physician Credentialing and PeerReview Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 597, 610 (2000).
83. Id.at6lO-11.
84. Id. at 599.
85. Id.
86. George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial
Costs of Medical PeerReview Protection,52 ALA. L. REv. 723, 725 (2001).
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work history, all of which attests to his or her competence.87 For example,
part of the credentialing process typically includes contacting other hospitals
that previously employed the physician-applicant. 88 If another hospital denied privileges to the physician-applicant, this may be a sufficient reason for
the committee to deny the applicant privileges and reject their application.89
Subsequent re-evaluations of a physician's work will also be conducted
periodically after the physician has been granted privileges and has begun
working in the hospital. 90 Re-evaluation usually occurs once every one or
two years, depending on the length of the physician's contract for privileges
with the hospital. 9' These re-evaluations are equally as important as the
evaluation conducted during the application process and are based on quality assurance data and the physician's performance in the current hospital.
Re-evaluation is necessary to determine whether physicians have become
lax after securing privileges and, thus, is also a very important step in ensuring continuous quality care.93 Moreover, hospitals may find it easier to explain a prior incident that was overlooked when the physician applied than
to explain away incompetence occurring on its watch. The physician may
also be re-evaluated "whenever the committee has reason to believe that a
physician's conduct warrants immediate review. 94
When a physician's evaluation is assessed and found deficient, the evaluating committee may recommend that privileges be "limited, revised, suspended, revoked, or not renewed." 95 The rationalization for review after an
incident of possible malpractice is obvious: if patient safety is at stake, the
hospital would be negligent in failing to review the physician's actions.96
2.

PeerReview

One method of conducting periodic re-evaluation of a physician's performance is through a process known as "peer review," during which the
work of physicians is assessed by peer review boards or committees in order
to determine if proper care is being administered.97 Hospitals are required to
have a peer review process in place and to use it during the appointment and
87. Id.
88. Craig W. Dallon, UnderstandingJudicial Review of Hospitals' Physician Credentialingand Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 597, 613 (2000).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 599.
91. Id. at 611.
92. Newton, supra note 21, at 725
93. Griffith & Parker, supra note 17, at 207-08.
94. Newton, supra note 21, at 725.
95. Dallon, supra note 8, at 612.
96. Dallon, supra note 8, at 612.
97. Newton, supra note 21, at 723.
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reappointment processes that occur every two years.98 The American Medical Association (AMA) also encourages physicians to take part in peer review. 99
Peer review is premised on the theory that "practicing physicians are in
the best position to determine the competence of other practicing physicians
as they regularly observe one another's work and have the expertise to effectively evaluate that work."' ° The main goal of peer review is to determine whether physicians "should be providing certain health care services
[in the hospital] and, if so, which procedures and treatments they are qualified to perform."' 0 ' Once this analysis is made, the solution is either to "prevent [the] physician with quality problems from continuing to provide such
services or to cause the physician to improve the quality of services rendered. 102 Although the privileges and immunity provisions relevant to peer
review may hinder a plaintiffs negligent credentialing case, the idea is that
the increase in the quality of care provided as a result of peer review outweighs the harm to plaintiffs.'0 3
The peer review boards are made up of other physicians who are members of the hospital's medical staff,' °4 "who are not in direct economic competition with the individual physician under review.""5' ' In addition to the
staff physicians participating in peer review, the committee might also include an impartial hearing officer. 1°6 The peer review process, however, is
not the final step in determining whether physicians are awarded or maintain
privileges. The final decision is made by the hospital's governing body.'0 7

98. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 20.
99. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 26. In its 1998 Policy Compendium, the AMA states
that it
"(1) strongly reaffirms its continuing commitment to the development and maintenance of voluntary, professional directed peer review of medical care; and (2)
encourages physicians to expand their efforts to ensure that such care is of high
quality, appropriate duration and reasonable cost." The AMA also contends that
it is the ethical duty of a physician to share truthful information about the quality
of care a colleague gives to his or her patients when such information is requested by a credentialing body, provided that sharing the information is not
prohibited by a statute or regulation.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 20.
100. Newton, supra note 21, at 723.
101. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 12.
102. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 13.
103. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 55.
104. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 12.
105. Newton, supra note 21, at 725.
106. Newton, supra note 21, at 725.
107. Newton, supra note 21, at 725.
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The governing body, such as a Board of Trustees, however, relies very heavily on the committee's recommendation." 8
In order to persuade physicians to participate in the peer review
process, most states give participants some sort of statutory protection."°
These laws may do one or many of three things: (1) stipulate that the information obtained during peer review is privileged and inadmissible in court;
(2) grant participants, and sometimes the hospital, immunity from suit; and
(3) require that the information be kept confidential. "0
a.

Privilege

Privilege refers to the "discoverability and admissibility of evidence"
in a legal matter."' Because of privilege, records used in the peer review
process are not discoverable in a lawsuit." 2 The theory behind privileging
this information is that "[clonstructive professional criticism cannot occur in
an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used as
a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit.""l 3
Privilege is only offered through state statutes; there is presently no
federal peer review privilege statute." 4 These statutes vary from state-tostate-the protection differs depending on the types of committees and hospital authorities the statute covers." 5 Some privilege statutes also govern
who may testify in a court proceeding" 6 and whether peer review documents
may be released to state licensing boards for disciplinary procedures." 7
b.

Immunity

In order to function most effectively and to ensure honest participation,
peer review statutes offer varying degrees of immunity to certain persons

108. Newton, supra note 21, at 725. See also Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 13.
109. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 16-17.
110. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 17.
111. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 17.
112. Gustafson & Masterson, supra note 1, at 23. See also Newton, supra note 21, at 730
("Most states offer peer review participants immunity from civil liability. The strongest of
these statutes offer immunity to committee members, institutions, and individuals providing
information to the committee. On the other side of the spectrum, the weaker of the statutes
grant immunity for few or specific individuals in the process.").
113. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time ForA Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7,18 (1999).
114. Id. at 33.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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and entities involved in the peer review process."' For instance, most states
give peer review committee members immunity from civil liability." 9
Usually, this kind of immunity is narrowly construed and limited to the
express language of the statute.' 20 "Good faith" is a common term in these
immunity statutes, which does allow a plaintiff some leeway if he or she can
prove "that the peer review was not conducted in good faith."' 2 ' This seems
more applicable, however, to a suit brought by a physician after being denied privileges rather than a suit between the hospital and a patient based
that require good faith do
upon negligent credentialing. 22 Also, the 1statutes
23
not always define "malice" or "bad faith."'
c.

Confidentiality

The confidentiality provisions generally do not come into play during a
lawsuit-the privilege statutes serve that purpose. 24 Instead, confidentiality
is necessary in instances when the peer review information may be released
to third parties. 25 Because the confidentiality requirement only applies to
non-judicial third parties, it usually does not arise when a patient decides to
bring a negligent credentialing claim. 126 Privilege statutes-not confidentiality statutes-remove peer review information from the purview of the legal
system.127
Participants in the peer review process are expected to maintain confidentiality regarding the evaluations, which allows all of the participants the
118. Id.at28-29.
119. Rodney H. Lawson & Charles Josef Blanchard, The Peer Review and SelfEvaluation Privileges andImmunities-Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?,3 SEDONA CONF.
J. 123, 124 (2002). See also Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 28-29.
120. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time ForA Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 30 (1999).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 23. For example, Scheutzow also noted that:
[i]f a hospital engages in peer review but decides not to curtail a physician's privileges, and later that physician harms a patient in a manner that could have been
avoided had the physician's privileges been modified, the hospital may nonetheless be shielded from liability unless the plaintiff can prove that failure to sanction a physician was performed in "bad faith."
Id.
123. Id. at 30. Scheutzow also notes "bad faith arguably could include the hospital's failure to sanction a physician with known deficiencies because the physician admits significant
numbers of patients to the hospital and generates large amounts of revenue for the hospital."
Id. at23.
124. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time ForA Change?,25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 17 (1999).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 53-54.
127. Id.
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freedom to evaluate honestly and without fear of retribution.'2 8 The reasoning behind the need for strict confidentiality is that such confidentiality will
result in honest assessments, which will bring about needed change and,
consequently, an increase in the quality of care given. 2 9
The confidentiality requirement may be made through contract or by
law. 130 Many states, however, do not have a statute requiring confidentiality,
making confidentiality the prerogative of the hospital and the physicians
with whom it contracts.' 3' Most of the states that have enacted statutes require confidentiality but fail to define repercussions or sanctions in the event
32
that confidentiality is breached.
d.

Health Care Quality Improvement Act

Congress recognized the value of peer review by enacting the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) 33 with the goal of promoting the
quality of health care that patients receive and, thereby, decreasing malpractice.'3 As one commentator noted, by enacting HCQIA, Congress "specifically acknowledged that the practice of medicine by incompetent physicians
was a significant problem, that peer review was a way to remedy this problem[,] and35 that there should be federal protection of the peer review
1
process."'

128. Lawson & Blanchard, supra note 115, at 123.
129. Lawson & Blanchard, supra note 115, at 124.
130. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 35.
131. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 35.
132. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 35-36.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 11111-11152. (West 2008).
134. Dallon, supra note 8, at 625.
135. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time ForA Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 17 (1999). In stating its intent in passing the
legislation, Congress noted that:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve
the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State. (2) There is
a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from
State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent performance. (3) This nationwide problem can be remedied
through effective professional peer review. (4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal
antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective
professional peer review. (5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
Id. at 17-18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1101).
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HCQIA, grants immunity to peer review participants and entities "engaging in good faith peer review."' 36 HCQIA also addresses confidentiality,
but only with regard to information reported to the National Practitioner
Data Bank,137 the formation of which is the second purpose of the statute. 3 '
The immunity provided by HCQIA applies only when the protected individuals or entities "engage in a 'professional review action."" 39 The idea is to
promote this "professional review activity by providing peer review members with qualified immunity" if and when a private cause of action is filed
against them."4 Also, to qualify for HCQIA immunity, certain due process
requirements must be met. 1 ' Immunity may also be denied if a hospital has
"substantially failed" to report required information to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).' 42 Regardless of state law immunity provisions,
peer review participants are entitled to at least the level of immunity provided by HCQIA. 4 3 If a state statute contains broader immunity provisions,
however, the participant is entitled to the higher level of immunity."
with regard to inforHCQIA does not grant a federal evidentiary privilege
145
mation obtained during the peer review process.
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id. at 36. "In so doing, Congress refrained from creating a federal cause of action for
breaching the confidentiality of the peer review process." Id.
138. Id. at 10. The NPDB is a national clearinghouse of information, and the idea behind
its formation was to "prevent physicians who had their clinical privileges at a hospital limited
due to quality problems from moving to other hospitals with impunity. Id.
139. Id. at 30.
Professional review actions are defined as activities of a health care entity "(A)
to determine whether the physician may have clinical privileges with respect to,
or membership in, the entity, (B) to determine the scope or conditions of such
privileges or membership, or (C) to change or modify such privileges or membership."
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 30.
140. Susan L. Homer, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History,
Provisions,Applications andImplications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 455, 467 (1990).
141. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time ForA Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 30-31 (1999).
To qualify for immunity, a professional review action must be taken: (1) in the
reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality healthcare, (2)
after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) after adequate notice
and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other
procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the
reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain the facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph
(3).
Id. at 31.
142. Id.at 31.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 9-10.
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The impact of HCQIA on a negligent credentialing claim is unclear;
the purpose of its enactment seems geared more towards disputes between a
hospital and peer review participants. 146 The statute, however, does contain
the following language:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting in any manner the
rights and remedies afforded patients under any provision of Federal of
State Law to seek redress for any harm or injury suffered as a result of
negligent treatment or care by any physician, health care practitioner, or
health care entity, or as limiting any defense of immunities147available to
any physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity.
In St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital v. Agbor,148 however, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the idea that HCQIA immunity does not apply to negligent credentialing cases because of this language. 49 The court explained
that a claim for negligent credentialing "is not a claim related to 'treatment
or care by any physician,' but is instead related to the failure of a hospital to
review adequately a physician's qualifications."' 5 °
Because the main job of the peer review committee is to credential
physicians and to investigate suspect practices by a physician, 5 ' the immunity given to committee members and the privilege that keeps the documents
from being discoverable severely limits the ability of a plaintiff to prove
negligent credentialing1 52 The ultimate goal, however, of achieving high
quality medical care, and the necessity of peer review for that exact purpose,
almost always will keep peer review documents and information out of discovery. 53
'

146. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 24.
147. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 24 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11115 (d)) (emphasis in original).
148. 952 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1997)
149. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 24.
150. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 24.
151. Lawson & Blanchard, supra note 115, at 123-24.
152. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 25.
153. Lawson & Blanchard, supra note 115, at 130.
It seems fairly predictable that once hospitals and physicians realize that heretofore privileged communications are now discoverable, meaningful peer review
would soon become a thing of the past. If those clamoring for a wholesale evisceration of the peer review privileges in the name of physician accountability got
their way, the long-term result would be only a worsening of the system they
now decry. The chilling effect on full, fair, frank, "on the record" peer review
would seem to be obvious.
Lawson & Blanchard, supra note 115, at 130.
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Administrative Precautions Taken to Prevent Negligent Credentialing

Hospitals must meet certain requirements to remain in good standing
with both state and national agencies.t 4 For example, most states require
hospitals to report actions taken that adversely affect a physician's staff
membership or privileges.'55 HCQIA also imposes requirements for reporting to the NPDB.' 56 Meeting the criterion or following the suggestions of
other health organizations could decrease a hospital's chance of negligently
credentialing a physician before he or she causes harm.157
1.

Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations

The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) Is8 is an organization that evaluates the overall performance of
healthcare organizations, formed with the purpose of establishing "minimum
hospital standards for patient care."' 59 Hospitals are not required to obtain
JCAHO accreditation, but JCAHO accreditation allows hospitals to automatically participate in the Medicare program without additional certification. 16 Depending on state statutes, JCAHO accreditation may also fulfill
certain licensing requirements.' 6 ' Also, at least one court has recognized the
importance of JCAHO accreditation when obtaining approval of internship
and residency programs.'62
To qualify for accreditation, JCAHO requires hospitals to implement
and maintain a peer review system. 63 Hospitals must also "adopt uniform
criteria for evaluating persons applying for medical staff membership and

153. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 20.
155. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 38.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (West 2008). This section is entitled "Reporting of certain professional review actions taken by health care entities." Id.
156. Gustafson & Masterson, supranote 1, at 18.
158. Formerly the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. Scheutzow, supra
note 7, at 13.
159. Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1383 n.13 (Alaska 1987). See also William Dornette, The Legal Impact on Voluntary Standards in Civil Actions Against the Health Care
Provider,22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 925-28 (1977); Holbrook & Dunn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Discoverability and Use of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee

Records, 16

WASHBURN

L.J. 54, 57 (1976).

160. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 20.
161. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 20-21.
162. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1383 (citing American Medical Association Directory of Accredited Residencies 3 (1975-76)).
163. B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy,
10 AM. J.L. &MED. 151, 151 (1984).
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existing
staff members," and fulfill all other requirements necessary to qual164
ify.
2. Reporting to the National PractitionerData Bank and State
Licensing Boards
The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) was formed by the
enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(e) to establish a national system for
reporting adverse decisions of a peer review committee. 165 The purpose of
this process is to prevent physicians whose privileges have been denied or
revoked from moving to new hospitals in other states that are unaware of the
physician's past. 66 HCQIA requires hospitals to make various reports to the
NPDB, 167 such as certain actions taken after peer review is conducted that
result in limitations to a physician's staff or clinical privileges for longer
than thirty days. 168 Hospitals also must report instances when physicians
"voluntarily surrender their medical staff privileges" rather than undergo a
peer review investigation. 169 If hospitals do not complete these reports,
their
70
peer review participants may lose their HCQIA-provided immunity.
State licensing boards coordinate reporting between hospitals and the
NPDB. 17' During both the credentialing stage and reappointment procedures, HCQIA requires hospitals to request information on the applying
physician from the NPDB. 7 2 The goal is that if hospitals are diligent in both
reporting to and using the NPDB, a physician who has been stripped of privileges at one hospital will not be able to move easily to a new hospital.'73
Some peer review proceedings, however, are not reported to the NPDB because they do not fall into a category that requires reporting; for instance,
"peer review proceedings not resulting in adverse decisions, peer review not
based on a physician's competence or professional conduct, [or]174 adverse
actions resulting in suspension of privileges for thirty days or less"'

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 20.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 10.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 10.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 36.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 10, 36-37.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 10.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 37.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 37.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 37.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 37.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 37.
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Arkansas's Approach

Negligent credentialing is an issue of first impression in Arkansas, but
there are statutes and administrative policies in place that will impact any
future ruling on such a case.'75 Arkansas law provides for licensure by the
state medical board 7 6 and peer review of medical staff members. 77 Arkansas's peer review statutes include provisions that render all information obtained during peer review privileged179from discovery 178 and that provide immunity for peer review participants.
Arkansas hospitals are also statutorily required to report any revocation, limitation, or termination of a physician's privileges to the Arkansas

175. See Ark. Code Ann. § 17-95-303 and § 20-9-501 (West 2008).
176. Ark. Code Ann § 17-95-303 (West 2008). This section states, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he Arkansas State Medical Board shall... [e]xamine, as is provided for by law, all applicants for a license to practice medicine in this state" Id. at § 17-95-303(8).
177. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-501 (West 2008). A peer review committee is defined as "a
committee of a hospital medical staff or a committee of a state or local professional association" with the dual purposes of "evaluat[ing] and improv[ing] the quality of health care rendered by providers of health services [and] ... [d]etermin[ing] that ... [h]ealth services rendered were professionally indicated or were performed in compliance with the applicable
standard of care.., or [t]he cost of health care rendered was considered reasonable by the
providers of professional health services in the area." Id.
178. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-503 (West 2008). This section states, in pertinent part,
(a)(1) The proceedings and records of a peer review committee shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are subject
to evaluation and review by the committee.
(2) No person who was in attendance at a meeting of the committee shall be
permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of the committee or as
to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of the
committee or any members thereof.
(b)(1) However, information, documents, or records otherwise available from
original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in any
such action merely because they were presented during the proceedings of the
committee.
Id.
179. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-502 (West 2008). This section states, in pertinent part,
(a) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action for
damages shall arise against, any member of a peer review committee for any act
or proceeding undertaken or performed within the scope of the functions of the
committee if the committee member acts without malice or fraud.
(b) This subchapter shall not be construed to confer immunity from liability on
any professional association or upon any health professional while performing
services other than as a member of a peer review committee.
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State Medical Board (ASMB). 80 Arkansas does not, however, have a statute
that imposes a penalty upon hospitals for failing to make a report to the
ASMB."8 '

M. PROPOSAL
Negligent credentialing is an issue of first impression in Arkansas.
When considering a remedy to this problem, the differences between enacting a solution through legislative means and leaving the issue to be resolved
by the judicial system must be carefully weighed. A wait-and-see approach
could prove dangerous; there is no guarantee that the right case is going to
come along because the elements of a negligent credentialing claim are so
specific and evidence is difficult to come by. 82 Moreover, most cases involving claims of medical negligence ultimately settle. 8 3 A statute that clarifies the duties a hospital owes its patients would aid both potential plaintiffs
and hospitals in better understanding their respective rights and liabilities.
Conversely, it is the responsibility of the judicial branch to determine
precedent and interpret the law. This section examines these two approaches
to determine which actions would be best for both Arkansas hospitals and
patients, and it suggests several options the legislature and the courts could
take when acting on the issue of negligent credentialing.
A.

Statutory Remedies

A statutory solution is desirable because it is potentially a quicker solution to the problem. With proper research and drafting, a statute could go
into effect within a legislative session, which is a much more expedient option than waiting for a cause of action to arise and make its way through the
courts. Also, there are many steps the legislature could take that would benefit both hospitals and plaintiffs, such as defining the duties that hospitals
owe patients and revamping the peer review statutes to increase effectiveness.

180. Ark. Code Ann. § 17-95-104 (West 2008). This section provides that hospitals must
report these actions to the ASMB within sixty days. Id.
181. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 58.
182. Interview with Diane Mackey, February 29, 2008. Professor Mackey is Director of
the Juris Doctorate/Master of Public Health Dual Degree Program, and she has also been
jointly appointed by the UALR Bowen School of Law and the UAMS College of Public
Health to serve as Assistant Dean for Institutional and Organizational Affairs. Professor
Mackey has taught health law, public health law, and was in the private practice of law with
an emphasis on health law for many years.
183. Id.
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Hospitals' Statutory Duty to Patients

If and when the issue arises in Arkansas, a statute detailing the state's
policies regarding the liability of a hospital to its patient could be very helpful in guiding both a hospital in its everyday practice and the courts in deciding a case. In Alaska, for example, the statute has aided courts in making
decisions in hospital liability cases.' 84 Although an Alaska Supreme Court
case, Jackson v. Power,'85 inspired the legislature to enact the statute, subse186
quent cases have been decided based on the statute rather than precedent.
Given that a considerable number of jurisdictions in the United States have
addressed this problem to varying degrees, the Arkansas legislature would
have a plethora of resources from which to draft a statute.'87
Alaska Statutes Annotated Section 09.65.096 defines the liability of
hospitals for emergency room physicians, namely clarifying what action a
hospital must take in order to escape liability for the acts of an emergency
room physician who is an independent contractor. It also defines a hospital's88
responsibilities as to credentialing decisions and granting privileges.,
Adopting a statute similar to Alaska's would not only clarify the situations
184. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096 (West 2008).
185. 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
186. See Fletcher v. S. Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833, 839 (Alaska 2003).
187. See, Alaska - Fletcher v. South Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2003); Arizona - Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463 (Ariz. 1980); California - Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183
Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Florida - Insigna v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989); Georgia Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971); Illinois - Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965); Minnesota - Larson
v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007); Nevada - Oehler v. Humana Hospital Sunrise,
105 Nev. 348 (1989); Oklahoma - Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hosp. Trust Authority, 903
P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995); Pennsylvania - Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703
(Pa.1991); Washington - Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984); Wisconsin - Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708 (1981).
188. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096 (West 2008). The statute, entitled "Civil liability of
hospitals for certain physicians" states, in pertinent part:
(a) A hospital is not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission by
an emergency room physician who is not an employee or actual agent of the hospital if the hospital provides notice that the emergency room physician is an independent contractor and the emergency room physician is insured .... The
hospital is responsible for exercising reasonable care in granting privileges to
practice in the hospital, for reviewing those privileges on a regular basis, and for
taking appropriate steps to revoke or restrict privileges in appropriate circumstances. The hospital is not otherwise liable for the acts or omissions of an emergency room physician who is an independent contractor. The notice required by
this subsection must (1) be posted conspicuously in all admitting areas of the
hospital; (2) consist of a sign at least two feet high and two feet wide, with print
at least two inches high; (3) be published at least annually in a newspaper of general circulation in the area.
Id. The statute also provides an example of such a notice. Id.
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in which a hospital becomes liable for an independent contractor emergency
room physician, but it would also create statutory authority for hospitals
who want to avoid liability but are unsure as to the steps to take in order to
achieve that result.
Further, liability could be established to varying degrees: section
09.65.096 specifically addresses independent contractors performing emergency room services. 189 The Arkansas legislature could follow Alaska's approach or, alternatively, broaden the hospital's liability by applying the noliability standard to certain hospital-based independent contractor physicians, such as pathologists, anesthesiologists, and emergency room physicians. The legislature could also choose a middle ground between these two
options.
2.

PeerReview Statutes

Another positive step that the legislature could take to increase the efficiency of the process is to amend the peer review statutes.1 9 This step
makes the process more efficient because the underlying goal is increased
quality in patient care, and the peer review process is designed to ensure that
the highest level of care is administered. 91 The peer review process merits
special attention because of the importance of preventing the exploitation of
the privileges and immunities that go along with it.'92 If the peer review
process is not administered effectively, not only are patients unlikely to receive the highest degree of care, but also hospitals and physicians may gain
an unfair advantage over the patient in a medical malpractice suit. 93 The
privileges and immunities section of peer review statutes could operate to
conceal the work product of peer review, or lack thereof, and physicians and
hospitals would merely have to claim immunity under the peer review statutes to hide their lack of effort, thus defeating the designed purpose of peer
review statutes.' 94 The privileges and immunities peer review statutes, how189. Id.
190. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time ForA Change?,25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 13 (1999).
191. Id. "The purpose of peer review is to analyze critically the medical services rendered
by physicians, and if deficiencies exist, either to prevent a physician with quality problems
from continuing to provide such services or to cause the physician to improve the quality of
services rendered." Id.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Id. "[A] recent trend indicates that peer review protection laws are used to protect
hospitals from liability for failing to perform adequate peer review." Id.
194. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 10.
Because legislatures attempt to encourage peer review by granting protections rather than requiring it through mandates, a strategy that represents the proverbial
carrot as opposed to the stick approach, the question should be asked: Do these
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ever, are the very reason peer review produces honest and forthright results.' 9 This process leads to improved patient care; eliminating the privileges and immunities could ultimately cause more harm than benefits.'96
Mandates, including the related penalties that would enforce reporting
requirements, are one method that could be used to make the peer review
process more effective."9 A potential area of concern with peer review is the
frequency at which the peer review committee conducts reviews.1 9 If physicians are rarely reevaluated, the chance is small that the physicians who
need to improve the quality of the care they give will actually do so.' 99 Because no penalty exists in Arkansas for failure to timely conduct peer review,2' the threat of a penalty could encourage more participation and more
effective critiques.2"'

peer review protection statutes effectively encourage peer review? This question
is significant because the protection offered by state legislatures results in a loss
of legal recourse by aggrieved parties. If these peer review protection statutes are
ineffective, the loss of legal recourse is unwarranted.
Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 10.
195. Interview with Diane Mackey, February 29, 2008.
196. Id.
197. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It
Time For A Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 11 (1999). "If peer review is the key to enhanced quality of health care, stronger mandates to perform peer review and sanctions for
failure to do so are necessary to cause effective peer review to take place." Id.
198. Id. at 16.
199. Id.
If peer review is not as effective as it could be in enhancing quality health care
solely because it is not being used with sufficient frequency, peer review protection statutes, coupled with mandates sufficient to compel appropriate peer review, may be an answer.. . . [I]f legislatures want to encourage effective peer review, they must require it because protective legislation has been ineffective. If
mandates are adopted, keeping the peer review protection statutes in place may
be appropriate in the spirit of fairness to the physicians and hospitals required to
perform peer review. Without such mandates, however, the existing protection
statutes do not appear to benefit the public and instead burden the judicial
process.
Id.
200. Id. at 39. Thirty-three states-including Arkansas-and the District of Columbia
lack a penalty or reporting requirement with regard to their peer review statutes. Scheutzow,
supra note 7, at 39. See also Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-9-501 to -503 (West 2008) (Arkansas's
peer review statutes).
201. Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 56. The study upon which the author based her article
supports "the contention that institutions and individuals held responsible to injured patients
for failing to perform effective peer review will be more diligent in policing the profession
and taking corrective actions." Scheutzow, supra note 7, at 56.
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Administrative Precautions

Arkansas hospitals and the ASMB can also implement new policies
that would ensure credentialing decisions are made properly, peer review is
conducted efficiently, and the utmost degree of quality care is given to patients.
The authors of one article suggest that a detailed manual should be
used during the credentialing process.2" 2 The manual would include the following:
(1) The application form;
(2) The privilege form of each department and section of the hospital;
(3) The definition of a completed application;
(4) The definition of acceptable types of reference letters;
(5) Procedures for the pre-application request for privileges;
(6) Procedures for review at the department level;
(7) Procedures for the recommendations of the Credentials Committee;
(8) Procedures for the recommendations of the Executive Committee;
(9) Procedures for the applicant's interview at the Department and
Credentials Committee levels;
(10)Procedures for a "fair hearing," that is, procedures for applicant
access to adverse recommendations and appellate review;
(11l)Procedures for reporting of "professional review action" based
upon competence and conduct;
(12) Procedures for inquiry into the National Physician Data Bank.20 3
Creating such a manual would undoubtedly simplify the process and
render it more uniform. Providing such a manual would help the peer review committee in making consistent, fair decisions, and it would also offer
protection for the hospital by ensuring that the peer review process is conducted efficiently and non-negligently. 2°
202. Griffith & Parker, supra note 17, at 207.
203. Griffith & Parker, supra note 17, at 207.
204. Griffith & Parker, supra note 17, at 207.
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Suggestions for a Judicial Approach

Thirty-four states have decided negligent credentialing cases by adopting the corporate liability doctrine.20 5 The remaining states have either
looked to the other aforementioned theories or not addressed the issue at this
time. 20 6 While the vicarious liability approaches-for instance the nondelegable duty standard2 7 and the apparent agency theory 2 ---can be effective, the corporate liability doctrine advocated by Oklahoma is one of the
strongest examples of the theory and best establishes a clear and uniform
approach to negligent credentialing Arkansas should follow Oklahoma's
lead when the issue arises.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hospital Trust Authority,210 adopted the doctrine of corporate liability and stated
that:
[t]o the extent [that the] doctrine imposes a duty of ordinary care on hospitals to ensure that: 1) only competent physicians are granted staff privileges, and 2) once staff privileges are granted to a physician the hospital
takes reasonable steps to ensure patient safety when it knows or should
know2 1the
staff physician has engaged in a pattern of incompetent beha1
vior.

These parameters do not impose excessively harsh requirements on the
hospital, as the duty is only one of ordinary care; rather, they clearly establish the existence of a duty between the hospital and its patients. These requirements also cover the instances during which physicians' credentials
and behavior need to be monitored most closely-upon the granting of pri205. Gustafson & Masterson, supra note 1, at 19.
206. Gustafson & Masterson, supra note 1, at 19. A minority of states have rejected the
corporate liability theory when discussing negligent credentialing. Gustafson & Masterson,
supra note 1, at 19. See, e.g., McVay v. Rich, 874 P.2d 641,645 (Kan. 1994) (holding corporate negligence doctrine inapplicable under Kansas malpractice statutes); St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997) (holding that absent showing of malice,
hospital was immune from liability for its credentialing activities).
207. See, e.g., Fletcher v. S. Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833; Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d
1376. See also McWilliams & Russell, supra note 5, at 468. "The term non-delegable duty
has traditionally been used to describe a form of vicarious liability, liability on the part of the
delegating party regardless of any fault on its part." Id.
208. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 21, at 738.
208. See, e.g., Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hospital Trust Authority, 903 P.2d 263, (Okla. 1995).
210. 903 P.2d 263 (Okla.1995). Plaintiff represented the Estate of Geoffrey B. Teamey,
who died shortly after birth as a result of a "traumatic delivery by forceps" which caused
internal bleeding. Id. at 266-67. Geoffrey's parents' private physician held staff privileges at
the Defendant hospital. Id. at 266.
211. ld. at 266.
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vileges and when the situation indicates that re-evaluation is needed. When
evaluating this issue, Arkansas courts should also consider adding language
that includes periodic re-evaluations after the physician is granted privileges
in order to more fully address the entire evaluation process.2" 2
The Strubhart case is a classic example of corporate liability, particularly the failure to monitor incompetence after the granting of privileges.2" 3
In Strubhart, the plaintiff had evidence that other hospital employees had
21 4
concerns about the methods by which the physician treated his patients;
that he was an independent contractor; 2 5 and that an expert testified that,
given the evidence of likely substandard treatment on more than one prior
occasion, hospital personnel "knew they had a problem doctor on staff;" and
the nurses "should have taken this information into consideration" when
treating the patient.1 6 The defendant hospital argued that any alleged negligent behavior was committed only
by the physician, an independent contrac27
tor for whom it had no liability.
Basing its opinion on Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital21 8 and Pedroza v. Bryant,219 the Oklahoma Supreme Court rationalized that hospitals have an independent duty to patients to "supervise the
medical treatment provided by members of its medical staff' 220 and that reasonable care must be exercised in order to maintain the high level of care
characteristic of competent medical staffs. 221 The Strubhart court also
stressed the notion that hospitals are no longer free from liability for the
negligence of independent contractors due to the "public's perception of the
modern hospital as a multifaceted health care facility responsible for the
quality of medical care and treatment rendered. 222
Strubhart should serve as a leading example to Arkansas courts; it
clearly sets forth the standards, providing the duty of a hospital, while leaving room for the Arkansas courts to add to or tweak the standards to fit a
212. See Id. at 275. Strubhart, in dictum, states that "[j]urisdictions adopting corporate
negligence have also held that hospitals have a continuing duty to review and delineate staff
privileges so that incompetent staff physicians are not retained." Id.
213. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 267.
214. Id. "Plaintiff also presented evidence that Nurse Bowles and other hospital employees had previous concerns about Dr. Seal's treatment of patients .
Id. This evidence,
I.."
though admitted initially at the trial court stage, was deemed inadmissible at the conclusion
of the trial because it prejudiced the hospital and deprived the hospital of a fair trial, a sentiment that was echoed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court on appeal. Id. at 272.
215. Id. at 269.
216. Id. at 268.
217. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 268.
218. 33 Ill.2d 296 (1965).
219. 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984).
220. Strubhart,903 P.2d at 275.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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judge's particular understanding of the corporate liability doctrine and the
varying facts of a negligent credentialing cause of action.
The majority of states that have addressed negligent credentialing appear to have adopted the best approach in allowing the judiciary to decide
this question. 223 A balanced attack, however, would include the legislature's
exertion of some influence in the discussion. The passage of bills requiring
more evaluations of competence or new procedures to monitor physicians'
activities would prove helpful in both informing hospitals of the goals they
should aspire to and in giving the hospitals greater ammunition to defeat a
negligence claim. When a hospital can show evidence of procedures and
steps it took to prevent negligence, malpractice, and general incompetence
among its physicians, it has a better shot of establishing that it has maintained its duty of care to its patients. Legislative attention, addressing negligent credentialing, would be particularly invaluable before it becomes a
problem, especially as we wait for a case to reach the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION

A negligent credentialing case eventually will present itself in the Arkansas court system. Therefore, the Arkansas legislature, in concert with the
ASMB and hospitals within the state, seriously should consider implementing a system that would better convey a hospital's direct liability to its patients. Whether this is accomplished by enacting a statute or through administrative action by the ASMB, both hospitals and patients will benefit if they
better understand the duties the hospital owes and the level of care the patient should expect to receive. If such preemptive measures are taken, perhaps negligent credentialing will cease, and the topic will remain an issue of
first impression in Arkansas for many years to come.
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